II. Zależności statystyczne

Marek Jerzy. Minakowski, Prehistoria logiki formalnej

I. Fragmenta prearistotelicorum

6. Katalog fragmentów logicznych znalezionych w pismach prearystotelików

28. Ksenofont, Cyropedia III, 1, 10–11 & 13–15 & 38

Król Persji Cyrus (Kyros) podbił zbuntowaną Armenię. Przeprowadza teraz sąd wojenny nad jej królem. Dowód układa się logicznie, ale podsumowanie napotyka trudności. W tym momencie (III, 1, 14) pojawia się deus ex machina: Sokrates, przedstawiony jako nauczyciel logiki: ten który uczy wyciągania konsekwencji.

Cyropedia jest powieścią, romansem pedagogicznym: akcja jej przeniesiona jest do Persji w VI w. p.n.e. Jest to jednak w sporej mierze „powieść z kluczem”, odwołująca się do realiów współczesnych Ksenofontowi. Sokrates jest tu reprezentowany przez „mędrca”: „sofistę” (w pozytywnym znaczeniu, nie ma tu jeszcze Platońskiego przeciwstawienia Sokratesa sofistom). Uczeń „Sokratesa”, ormiański książę Tigranes, mówi w imieniu samego Ksenofonta.

Cyrus, Ormianin, Tigranes (jego syn), „Sokrates”:

^{III. i. 10}Λέγε δή μοι, ἔϕη, ἐπολέμησάς ποτε ᾿Αστυάγει τῷ τῆς ἐμῆς μητρὸς πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Μήδοις;

῎Εγωγ', ἔϕη.

Κρατηϑεὶς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνωμολόγησας δασμὸν οἴσειν καὶ συστρατεύσεσϑαι ὅποι ἐπαγγέλλοι, καὶ ἐρύματα μὴ ἕξειν;

῏Ην ταῦτα.

Νῦν οὖν διὰ τί οὔτε τὸν δασμὸν ἀπῆγες οὔτε τὸ στράτευμα ἔπεμπες, ἐτείχιζές τε τὰ ἐρύματα;

᾿Ελευϑερίας ἐπεϑύμουν· καλὸν γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐλεύϑερον εἶναι καὶ παισὶν ἐλευϑερίαν καταλιπεῖν.

¹¹Καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἔϕη ὁ Κῦρος, καλὸν μάχεσϑαι, ὅπως μήποτέ τισ δοῦλος μέλλοι γενήσεσϑαι· ἢν δὲ δὴ ἢ πολέμῳ κρατηϑεὶς ἢ καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον δουλωϑεὶς ἐπιχειρῶν τις ϕαίνηται τοὺς δεσπότας ἀποστερεῖν ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦτον σὺ πρῶτος πότερον ὡς ἀγαϑὸν ἄνδρα καὶ καλὰ πράττοντα τιμᾷς ἢ ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἢν λάβῃς, καλάζεις;

Κολάζω, ἔϕη· οὐ γὰρ ἐᾷς σὺ ψεύδεσϑαι.

[…]

¹³Εἶεν· τὰ μὲν δὴ σὰ δίκαια ταῦτα, ὦ ᾿Αρμένιε· ἡμῖν δὲ τί συμβουλεύεις ἐκ τούτων ποιεῖν;

ὁ μὲν δὴ ᾿Αρμένιος ἐσιώπα ἀπορῶν πότερα συμβουλεύοι τῷ Κύρῳ κατακαίνειν αὑτὸν ἢ τἀναντία διδάσκοι ὧν αὐτὸς ἔϕη ποιεῖν. ¹⁴ὁ δὲ παῖς αὐτοῦ Τιγράνης ἐπήρετο τὸν Κῦρον·

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔϕη, ὦ Κῦρε, ἐπεὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἀποριοῦντι ἔοικεν, ἦ συμβουλεύσω περὶ αὐτοῦ ἃ οἶμαί σοι βέλτιστα εἶναι; καὶ ὁ Κῦρος, ᾐσϑημένος, ὅτε συνεϑήρα αὐτῷ ὁ Τιγράνης, σοϕιστήν τινα αὐτῷ συνόντα καὶ ϑαυμαζόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιγράνου, πάνυ ἐπεϑύμει αὐτοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὅ τι ποτ' ἐροίη· καὶ προϑύμως ἐκέλευσε λέγειν ὅ τι γιγνώσκοι.

¹⁵᾿Εγὼ τοίνυν, ἔϕη ὁ Τιγράνης, εἰ μὲν ἄγασαι τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ ὅσα βεβούλευται ἢ ὅσα πέπραχε, πάνυ σοι συμβουλεύω τοῦτον μιμεῖσϑαι· εἰ μέντοι σοι δοκεῖ πάντα ἡμαρτηκέναι, συμβουλεύω τοῦτον μὴ μιμεῖσϑαι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔϕη ὁ Κῦρος, τὰ δίκαια ποιῶν ἥκιστ' ἂν τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα μιμοίμην. ῎Εστιν, ἔϕη, ταῦτα. Κολαστέον ἄρ' ἂν εἴη κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸν πατέρα, εἴπερ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δίκαιον κολάζειν.

[…]

³⁸Διασκηνούντων δὲ μετὰ δεῖπνον ἐπήρετο ὁ Κῦρος· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔϕη, ὦ Τιγράνη, ποῦ δὴ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνὴρ ὃς συνεϑήρα ἡμῖν καὶ σύ μοι μάλα ἐδόκεις ϑαυμάζειν αὐτόν.

Οὐ γάρ, ἔϕη, ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτὸν οὑτοσὶ ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ;

Τί λαβὼν ἀδικοῦντα;

Διαϕϑείρειν αὐτὸν ἔϕη ἐμέ. καίτοι [γ', ἔϕη], ὦ Κῦρε, οὕτω καλὸς κἀγαϑὸς ἐκεῖνος ἦν ὡς καὶ ὅτε ἀποϑνῄσκειν ἔμελλε προσκαλέσας με εἶπε·

Μήτι σύ, ἔϕη, ὦ Τιγράνη, ὅτι ἀποκτείνει με, χαλεπανϑῇς τῷ πατρί· οὐ γὰρ κακονοίᾳ τῇ σῇ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοίᾳ· ὁπόσα δὲ ἀγνοίᾳ ἄνϑρωποι ἐξαμαρτάνουσι, πάντ' ἀκούσια ταῦτ' ἔγωγε νομίζω.

1.

Κρατηϑεὶς […] ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (III, 1,10)

᾿Αρμένιος ⊆ κρατηϑείς

Ormianin ⊆ podbity

Zał.

2.

οὔτε τὸν δασμὸν ἀπῆγες οὔτε τὸ στράτευμα ἔπεμπες, ἐτείχιζές τε τὰ ἐρύματα (III, 1,10)

᾿Αρμένιος ⊆ στρατεύων

Ormianin ⊆ walczący

Zał.

3.

ἢν […] πολέμῳ κρατηϑεὶς […] τις ϕαίνηται τοὺς δεσπότας ἀποστερεῖν ἑαυτοῦ […] ὡς ἀδικοῦντα […] καλάζεις (III, 1,11)

κρατηϑείς ∩ στρατεύων ⊆ ἀδικῶν

podbity ∩ walczący ⊆ przestępca

Zał.

4.

τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δίκαιον κολάζειν (III, 1,15)

ἀδικῶν ⊆ δίκαιος κολάζειν

przestępca ⊆ godzien kary

Zał.

5.

Κολαστέον […] ἂν εἴη […] τὸν πατέρα (III, 1,15)

᾿Αρμένιος ⊆ δίκαιος κολάζειν

Ormianin ⊆ godzien kary

1., 2., 3., 4., R1.2.6.4

(Loeb)

”Tell me then”, said the other [=Cyrus], ”did you ever have a war with Astyages, my mother's father, and with the rest of the Medes?”

”Yes,” he answered, ”I did.”

”And when you were conquered by him, did you agree to pay tribute and to join his army, wherever he should command you to go, and to own no forts?”

”Those are the facts.”

”Why, then, have you now failed to pay the tribute and to send the troops, and why have you been building forts?”

”I longed for liberty; for it seemed to me to be a glorious thing both to be free myself and to bequeath liberty to my children.”

”You are right,” said Cyrus; ”it is a noble thing to fight that one may never be in danger of becoming a slave. But if any one has been conquered in war or in any other way reduced to servitude and is then caught attempting to rob his masters of himself, are you first man to reward him as an honest man and one who does right, or do you punish him as a malefactor if you catch him?”

”I punish him,” said he; ”for you will not let me tell a lie.”

[…]

”Very well, king of Armenia; so that is your idea of justice; in accordance with it, then, what do you advise us to do?”

Then the Armenian was silent, for he was in a quandary whether to advise Cyrus to put him to death or to propose to him a course opposite to that which he admitted he himself always took. But his son Tigranes put a question to Cyrus, saying: ”Tell me, Cyrus, since my father seems to be in doubt, may I advise you in regard to him what I think the best course for you?”

Now Cyrus had observed when Tigranes used to go hunting with him that there was a certain philosopher with him who was an object of admiration to Tigranes; consequently he was very eager to hear what he would say. So he bade him express his opinion with confidence.

”Well,” said Tigranes, ”if you approve either of my father's theory or his practice, then I advise you by all means to imitate him. But if you think he has done wrong throughout, I advise you not to imitate him.”

”Well then,” said Cyrus, ”if I should do what is right, I should surely not be imitating the one who does wrong.”

”That is true,” said he.

”Then, according to your reasoning, your father must be punished, if indeed it is right that the one who does wrong should be punished.”

[…]

And after dinner, as the party was breaking up, Cyrus asked: ”Tell me, Tigranes, where is the man who used to hunt with us? You seemed to admire him very much.”

”Ah,” he replied, ”did not my father here have him put do death?”

”What wrong did he find him doing?”

”He said that he was corrupting me. And yet, Cyrus,” said he, ”he was so noble and so good that when he was about to be put to death, he called me to him and said: ‘be not angry with your father, Tigranes, for putting me to death; for he does it, not from any spirit of malice, but from ignorance, and when men do wrong from ignorance, I believe they do it quite against their will.'”